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Abstract Efﬁcient ﬂexible behavior requires continuous
monitoring of performance for possible deviations from the
intended goal of an action. This also holds for joint action.
When jointly performing a task, one needs to not only know
the other’s goals and intentions but also generate behavioral
adjustments that are dependent on the other person’s task.
Previous studies have shown that in joint action people not
only represent their own task but also the task of their co-
actor.Thecurrentstudyinvestigatedwhethertheseso-called
shared representations affect error monitoring asreﬂected in
the response-locked error-related negativity (Ne/ERN) fol-
lowing own errors. Sixteen pairs of participants performed a
social go/no-go task, while EEG and behavioral data were
obtained. Responses were compatible or incompatible rel-
ative to the go/no-go action of the co-actor. Erroneous
responses on no-go stimuli were examined. The results
demonstrated increased Ne/ERN amplitudes and longer
reaction times following errors on compatible compared to
incompatible no-go stimuli. Thus, Ne/ERNs were larger
after errors on trials that did not require a response from the
co-actor either compared to errors on trials that did require a
response from the co-actor. As the task of the other person is
the only difference between these two types of errors, these
ﬁndings show that people also representtheir co-actor’s task
during error monitoring in joint action. An extension of
existing models on performance monitoring in individual
action is put forward to explain the current ﬁndings in joint
action. Importantly, we propose that inclusion of a co-
actor’s task in performance monitoring may facilitate
adaptive behavior in social interactions enabling fast anti-
cipatory and corrective actions.
Keywords Joint action  Performance monitoring 
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Introduction
When performing a task with or against another person,
knowledge about the goals and intentions of the person one
is interacting with is crucial. Recent studies have demon-
strated that in joint action people not only represent their
own task, but also the task of their co-actors. These
so-called shared representations have also been shown to
affect one’s own motor behavior, as reﬂected in slower
response times (Sebanz et al. 2003, 2005) or in effects on
EEG measures of response inhibition (De Bruijn et al. 2008;
Sebanz et al. 2006a, b; Tsai et al. 2006, 2008). Hence, these
studies demonstrated that performing a task in a social
context affects one’s own action-control processes through
the formation of shared representations. However, it is
unknown whether the evaluative process of error monitor-
ing is also affected by knowledge of the other’s task.
Importantly, efﬁcient ﬂexible behavior requires contin-
uous monitoring of ongoing behavior for possible devia-
tions from the intended goal of an action. This monitoring
is essential, as humans have to perform their actions in an
environment that is constantly changing and thus requires
ﬂexible adaptations. Notably, this also holds for joint
action. When jointly performing a task, one needs to not
only incorporate the other’s goals and intentions, but also
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other person’s task. For example, when missing a turn
while driving, the type of remedial actions taken might be
different depending on the task at hand of the passenger.
Was he or she carefully paying attention and keeping track
of the road map or staring out of the window absent-
mindedly? In other words, in joint action, the same per-
formed error may induce different neural and behavioral
responses depending on the task of a co-actor.
So far, existing theories on error monitoring have
focused on individual settings in which participants per-
form a task on their own. Studies using these tasks have
repeatedly demonstrated an event-related potential typi-
cally associated with erroneous responses. This component
has been termed the error negativity (Ne) or error-related
negativity (Ne/ERN) and is evident in the response-locked
event-related potential (ERP) as a sharp negative deﬂection
immediately following erroneous responses (Falkenstein
et al. 1990; Gehring et al. 1993). In error-monitoring the-
ories, representations of one’s own task (or ‘‘goal
response’’) play a central role. The so-called mismatch
theory of the response Ne/ERN states that error detection
can take place because a representation of the goal
response is compared to a representation of the actual
response (see Fig. 1a, upper panel; Coles et al. 2001;
Falkenstein et al. 1991). When this comparison process
results in a mismatch, the Ne/ERN will be generated in
posterior medial frontal brain areas including anterior
cingulate cortex or ACC (Ridderinkhof et al. 2004). The
larger the mismatch, the larger the Ne/ERN amplitude will
be. The central idea is that this error signal is then used as
input for remedial actions or error-correction processes.
Along with the mismatch theory, the Ne/ERN has also
been extensively described in terms of conﬂict monitoring
(Botvinick et al. 2001; Cohen et al. 2000; Yeung et al. 2004)
and reinforcement learning (Holroyd and Coles 2002).
Although these theoretical accounts are formulated around
different fundamental processes—error detection, conﬂict
monitoring, or reinforcement learning—the similarities
between the three seem to be especially relevant to the
current study. At the center of the three theories is a signal
that carries high predictive information (either mismatch,
conﬂict, or a prediction error) used to improve performance
in the future and whose size determines the amplitude of the
Ne/ERN and successive behavioral changes.
An often-reported form of remedial actions is so-called
post-error slowing (Rabbitt 1966), and it describes the phe-
nomenon that people slow down following errors resulting
fromprematureresponding.Itisthoughttoreﬂectacautious
changeofresponsestrategyaimedatminimizingsubsequent
similar errors. Single-trial Ne/ERN analyses demonstrated
that larger Ne/ERN amplitudes resulted in more post-error
slowingonthetrialfollowingtheerror,thusdemonstratinga
directlinkbetweenthesizeoftheNe/ERNandtheamountof
behavioral adjustments (Debener et al. 2005).
In the current study, we use a social go/no-go task
(De Bruijn et al. 2008, 2011) to investigate whether the
formation of shared representations affects error monitor-
ing and behavioral adjustments following errors. Or in
other words, do people also incorporate other’s task rep-
resentations into the comparison process enabling error
detection (see Fig. 1b, lower panel)? In the social go/no-go
task, pairs of participants will have to respond to frequent
target stimuli (go) and withhold this response to infrequent
distractor stimuli (no-go). It is expected that the frequency
distribution and speed instructions will especially result in
erroneous responses on no-go stimuli, and therefore these
trials will be the main focus of the analyses. All stimuli can
either be compatible or incompatible with respect to the
task (go or no-go) of the other person (see Fig. 2, left).
Importantly, this means that the only difference in a par-
ticipant on compatible and incompatible no-go stimuli is
the task of the other participant (i.e., responding or with-
holding). More speciﬁcally, on compatible no-go trials,
both participants have to withhold their response, while on
incompatible no-go trials one has to withhold while the
other has to respond. Differences in processing of these two
types of no-go stimuli will be reﬂected in the effects of
compatibility and will thus only be present when people
also represent the task of their co-actor. Through
Fig. 1 a Schematic representation of the mismatch hypothesis of the
Ne/ERN as proposed by Coles et al. (2001). A representation of the
actual response is compared to a representation of the goal response.
In the case of an error, this comparison process will result in
mismatch, triggering an error signal and generating the Ne/ERN. The
larger the mismatch, the larger the Ne/ERN amplitude will be.
b Proposed extension of the mismatch hypothesis to joint-action
situations. A representation of the other’s goal response is included in
the comparison process and may thus affect the magnitude of the
mismatch and resulting Ne/ERN amplitude
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on compatible and incompatible no-go stimuli, we will be
able to investigate whether shared representations have an
effect on error monitoring as reﬂected in the amplitude of
the Ne/ERN. If participants also incorporate the represen-
tation of the goal response of their competitor in the
comparison process, a larger mismatch and thus increased
Ne/ERN amplitude is expected on erroneous responses to
compatible distractor stimuli compared to incompatible
distractor stimuli. However, no differences in Ne/ERN
amplitude between erroneous responses to compatible and
incompatible stimuli are expected when people do not
incorporate a representation of the task of the other.
Methods
Participants
Eighteen pairs of participants performed a social go/no-go
task. EEG was recorded from one participant in each pair,
while behavioral data was collected from both (see Fig. 2,
right). All were right-handed and had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. Two pairs were removed from the data-
sets because of excessive EEG artifacts. Only the data from
the EEG participants (12 women; 4 men; mean age =
22.3 years, SD = 2.6 years) will be reported. All partici-
pants were paid 8 euro per hour for participation.
Design and procedure
The aim of the task was to respond as quickly and accu-
rately as possible to the presentation of a single letter on a
computer screen. Each member of the pair is instructed to
respond following presentation of two of the letters (70%
‘‘go’’) and to withhold their response to the other two let-
ters (30% ‘‘no-go’’) (see Fig. 2, left). There was only
partial overlap between letter-response assignments such
that on 70% of the trials (compatible trials), the letter
stimuli required the same action in both members of the
pair (both should respond or both should withhold their
response), while on 30% of the trials (incompatible trials)
the required action was different (one should respond while
theothershouldwithholdtheirresponse).Eachstimulus(the
letters P, F, E, or T) was associated with one of these four
conditions. Stimuli were presented for 100 ms in white
againstablackbackgroundinthecenterofacomputerscreen
between two gray boxes (see Fig. 2, right). The boxes cor-
responded to the response buttons of the left and right par-
ticipant, namely the left gray box colored yellow when the
left participant responded—the right gray box colored yel-
low when the right participant responded. The intertrial
interval varied randomly between 2,000 and 3,000 ms. An
experimental session consisted of eight blocks of 200 trials.
All participants were wearing earplugs to prevent any pos-
sible acoustic feedback from response buttons.
Half of the EEG participants were assigned to the left
sitting position and half of them to the right. Before the
start of the experiment, all participants received the same
task instruction describing and emphasizing the stimulus–
response mappings for the both of them. As a result, par-
ticipants were aware of not only their own task but also
their competitor’s task. Importantly, they were explicitly
instructed to always try to respond faster than their com-
petitor. This speed instruction was especially relevant in
the competitive compatible go condition. A previous study
using this paradigm in a competitive context demonstrated
clear effects of shared representations on response inhibi-
tion (De Bruijn et al. 2008). The current competitive con-
text was therefore chosen to ensure the formation of shared
representations. Reaction-time feedback averaged over
correct responses per participant was presented after each
block and at the end of the experiment (total average
overall eight blocks). There was a short break between the
blocks. The total experiment lasted 2 h, including prepa-
ration and breaks.
Electrophysiological recording and data analyses
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 27 tin
electrodes mounted in an elastic electrode cap (Electrocap
International). Electrodes were placed at seven midline
(FPz/AFz/Fz/FCz/Cz/Pz/Oz) and twenty lateral (FP1-2/F7-
8/F3-4/FC5-6/T3-4/C3-4/CP5-6/T5-6/P3-4/O1-2) locations
Fig. 2 Left panel frequency
distribution of the four different
conditions in the social go/no-
go task. Right panel
experimental setup with EEG
participant sitting on the left
side
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10–20 system. All signals were referenced to the left
mastoid but were later off-line re-referenced to the average
of both mastoids. The vertical electro-oculogram (EOG)
was recorded bipolarly from electrodes placed above and
below the right eye. The horizontal EOG was recorded
bipolarly from electrodes lateral to both eyes. All electrode
impedances were kept below 5 kX. The EEG and EOG
signals were ampliﬁed using a time constant of 8 s (high
pass .02 Hz) and were ﬁltered off-line low pass at 15 Hz.
All signals were digitized with a sampling rate of 500 Hz.
Trials were excluded from both the behavioral and the
ERP analyses if one of the two participants had response
latency less than 150 ms (1.04% excluded). EOG artifact
correction was carried out using the procedure by Gratton
et al. (1983). Trials were averaged to ERPs separately for
each condition and each subject, relative to a 200 ms pre-
response baseline. Ne/ERN amplitude was determined on
error trials in separate subject averages by subtracting the
most negative peak in the 0–200 ms time window after
response onset from the most positive peak in the time
window starting 80 ms before and ending 80 ms after
response onset at electrode FCz, where the Ne/ERN
amplitude was largest (De Bruijn et al. 2007).
For the ERP analyses, average Ne/ERN amplitudes were
entered in a 2 9 2 repeated measures general linear model
(GLM) with the within subject factors correctness (correct,
error) and compatibility (compatible, incompatible). For
the behavioral analyses, individual average reaction times
were entered in a 2 9 2 repeated measures GLM with the
within subjects factor correctness (correct, error) and
compatibility (compatible, incompatible). Individual aver-
age accuracy rates were entered in a 2 9 2 repeated mea-
sures GLM with the within subject factors response type
(go, no-go) and compatibility (compatible, incompatible).
Finally, adaptive behavior following errors was investi-
gated by entering individual average reaction times for
correct responses to compatible go stimuli following
correct and incorrect responses in a 2 9 2 repeated mea-
sures GLM with the within subject factors post-correctness
(post-correct, post-error) and compatibility (compatible,
incompatible).
Results
Behavioral results
Reaction times
Figure 3 depicts the reaction times for the different con-
ditions. The reaction time analyses revealed main effects of
correctness [F (1, 15) = 106.79, P\.001, gp
2 = .88] and
compatibility [F (1, 15) = 10.23, P = .006, gp
2 = .41],
revealing faster reaction times for incorrect responses
(282 ms; SEM = 3.88) than for correct ones (331 ms;
SEM = 5.48) and slower reaction times to incompatible
(313 ms; SEM = 4.69) stimuli than to compatible ones
(301 ms; SEM = 4.40). However, the signiﬁcant interac-
tion between correctness and compatibility showed that the
main effect of compatibility was primarily caused by the
faster reaction times on the more frequent compatible go
stimuli than by the responses to the infrequent stimuli
[F (1, 15) = 47.87, P\.001, gp
2 = .76].
An additional analysis was conducted to compare the
reaction times of the two participants on incorrect incom-
patible no-go stimuli. The results showed that incorrect
responses from the EEG participant on incompatible no-go
stimuli were faster (278 ms; SEM = 3.93) than the correct
responses on the same trial from the behavioral participant
[340 ms; SEM = 11.18; t = 5.60, P\.001].
Accuracy
As expected, the accuracy rate analyses revealed a main
effect for response type [F (1, 15) = 105.15, P\.001,
gp
2 = .88], indicating better performance on the more fre-
quent go stimuli (99.5%; SEM = .15) than on the infre-
quent no-go stimuli (77.0%; SEM = 2.22). There was
neither a main effect for compatibility [F (1, 15) = 3.04,
P = .102, gp
2 = .17] nor a signiﬁcant interaction between
the two [F (1, 15) = 3.73, P = .072, gp
2 = .20].
Post-error slowing
The analyses on adaptive behavior following errors
revealed a main effect of post-correctness, indicating
Fig. 3 Reaction times for correct (gray bars) and Incorrect (black
bars) responses to compatible and incompatible stimuli. Error bars
represent standard errors
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123slower reaction times on correct trials following errors
(332 ms; SEM = 6.71) than following correct responses
[318 ms; SEM = 4.34; F (1, 15) = 19.30, P = .001,
gp
2 = .56], reﬂecting post-error slowing. The main effect of
compatibility was not signiﬁcant [F (1, 15) = 3.80,
P = .070, gp
2 = .20], but the interaction between the two
did reach signiﬁcance [F (1, 15) = 35.23, P\.001,
gp
2 = .70]. This interaction was further investigated by
means of two-tailed paired t-tests and showed that reaction
times following correct responses were faster for compat-
ible (306 ms; SEM = 4.69) than for incompatible stimuli
[329 ms; SEM = 4.34; t =- 8.91, P\.001], but the
reverse pattern was found for reaction times following
errors, indicating slower responses following errors on
compatible stimuli (339 ms; SEM = 6.80) than following
errors on incompatible ones [326 ms; SEM = 7.41;
t = 2.78, P = .014].
ERP results
Figure 4a depicts the response-locked grand average
waveforms for correct and incorrect responses. The Ne/
ERN peaked around 65 ms after response onset and had a
typical frontocentral topographical distribution as can be
seen in Fig. 4b. As expected from previous studies, the Ne/
ERN amplitude analyses revealed a main effect for cor-
rectness [F (1, 15) = 15.43, P = .001, gp
2 = .51], reveal-
ing increased Ne/ERN amplitudes for incorrect responses
(13.84 lV; SEM = 1.22) compared to correct ones
(8.21 lV; SEM = .92). There was no signiﬁcant main
effect for compatibility [F (1, 15) = 2.93, P = .108,
gp
2 = .16], but importantly, the interaction between the two
was signiﬁcant [F (1, 15) = 6.37, P = .023, gp
2 = .30].
Follow-up contrast analyses using two-tailed t-tests indi-
cated that Ne/ERN amplitudes on incorrect responses, i.e.,
on the no-go trials were larger for compatible stimuli
(15.01 lV; SEM = 1.39) than for incompatible ones
[12.67 lV; SEM = 1.21; t = 2.62, P = .019], but that this
was not the case for correct responses [t\1, P = .601].
Note that a peak-to-peak measure implies the presence
of a negative peak on correct ERP waveforms as well.
However, inspection of our individual averages revealed
that this was often not the case. Therefore, we conducted
additional analyses in which the Ne/ERN was quantiﬁed as
the mean amplitude in a time window from 40 to 80 ms
after response onset.
1 These analyses yielded similar
results. The amplitudes on incorrect responses were more
negative (-9.37 lV; SEM = 1.13) than on correct ones
[1.73 lV; SEM = .95; F (1, 15) = 104.72, P\.001,
gp
2 = .88]. There was no main effect of compatibility [F (1,
15) = 1.66, P = .217, gp
2 = .10], but the interaction
between the two was signiﬁcant [F (1, 15) = 7.56,
P = .015, gp
2 = .34]. Follow-up t-tests showed that, similar
to the peak-to-peak analyses, the amplitude on incorrect
responses was more negative for compatible stimuli
(-10.33 lV; SEM = 1.33) compared to incompatible ones
[-8.41 lV; SEM = 1.05; t =- 2.27, P = .038], but that
this was not the case for correct responses [t = 1.56,
P = .139].
Finally, to control for possible effects from actual
responses of a co-actor, which are present on erroneous
responses on incompatible trials but not on compatible
ones, additional mean-amplitude analyses were conducted
on a subset of participants (N = 10). Incorrect incompatible
trials were divided depending on whether the erroneous
response from the EEG participant was faster or slower than
the correct response from the behavioral participant. Also,
compatible no-go trials to which both participants respon-
ded incorrectly (double errors) were included. Participants
who had less than 10 trials in one of these conditions were
excluded from these additional analyses. Ne/ERN ampli-
tudes on the three extra error conditions were compared to
the amplitudes on the earlier described incorrect compatible
and incompatible trials. In line with the ﬁndings from the
complete set of participants, a main effect of error type was
found [F (1, 6) = 13.81, P = .003 gp
2 = .90]. Follow-up
simple contrasts referenced to erroneous incompatible
stimuli (7.88 lV; SEM = 1.38) showed that Ne/ERN
amplitudes were only signiﬁcantly increased for errors on
compatible stimuli [9.84 lV; SEM = 1.40; F (1, 9) =
14.15, P = .004] but not different for the other three error
types [Fast errors: 7.56 lV; SEM = 1.36; Slow errors:
8.12 lV; SEM = 1.63; Double errors: 7.09 lV;
SEM = 1.37; all F’s\1.23, all P’s[.29].
Discussion
In the current study, we investigated whether shared rep-
resentations have an effect on error monitoring as reﬂected
in the error-related negativity (Ne/ERN). The results
demonstrated increased Ne/ERN amplitudes for errors
following compatible no-go stimuli compared to erroneous
responses to incompatible no-go stimuli. In other words,
when you did respond erroneously while not only you but
also your co-actor had to withhold, Ne/ERN amplitude is
increased compared to the situation in which you did
respond but your co-actor had to respond anyway. Hence,
the present ﬁndings indicate that along with the earlier
reported effects on action control and action planning (De
Bruijn et al. 2008; Sebanz et al. 2003, 2005, 2006a; Tsai
1 Please note that additional analyses on the difference waves
(incorrect–correct) also showed the similar pattern of increased Ne/
ERNs on responses to compatible stimuli (-13.16 lV; SEM = 1.29)
compared to responses to incompatible ones [-10.34 lV;
SEM = 1.11; F (1,15) = 10.40, p = .006, gp
2 = .41].
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process of error monitoring. The ﬁnding of increased Ne/
ERNs following errors to compatible no-go stimuli shows
that when performing a task together with another person
one also incorporates the task of the other into one’s own
error-monitoring process.
Integrating error-monitoring theories and joint action
Interestingly, these error-monitoring ﬁndings in social
interaction can relatively easy be implemented in existing
theories of the Ne/ERN, like the mismatch hypothesis (see
Fig. 1b, lower panel). Figure 5 illustrates this schemati-
cally. If one assumes that along with the representation of
one’s own goal response and one’s own actual response,
people also incorporate the representation of the other’s
goal response, the mismatch hypothesis would exactly
predict the current ﬁndings. The mismatch resulting from
the comparison process of these different representations is
larger when the actual response not only differs from one’s
own goal response, but additionally deviates from the
other’s goal response. In the current experiment, this holds
for incorrect responses to compatible no-go stimuli and not
for incompatible no-go stimuli. For the latter type of
stimuli, the representation of the other’s goal response
actually resembles one’s own actual response and will thus
lead to a smaller mismatch and smaller Ne/ERNs.
As mentioned in the introduction, the mismatch hypoth-
esis is not the only existing theory of the Ne/ERN. The Ne/
ERN has, for example, also been extensively described in
terms of conﬂict monitoring (Botvinick et al. 2001; Cohen
et al. 2000; Yeung et al. 2004) or reinforcement learning
Fig. 4 a Grand average ERP waveforms relative to response onset
(time = 0 ms) for correct (dashed lines) and incorrect (solid lines)
responses to compatible (black lines) and incompatible stimuli (gray
lines). b Topographical maps showing the typical frontocentral
distribution of the Ne/ERN for incompatible and compatible errors
and the difference between the two at the time of peak onset (65 ms)
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on the mismatch hypothesis for interpretation purposes, we
wanttoemphasizethatasimilarlineofreasoningcanalsobe
applied for conﬂict monitoring and reinforcement learning.
Yeung and colleagues have demonstrated Ne/ERN ampli-
tudes to increase with increasing levels of post-response
conﬂict arising from simultaneous activation of actual- and
goal-response tendencies. The level of conﬂict is directly
reﬂected in the amplitude of the Ne/ERN. Our ﬁndings
suggest that the co-actor’s goal response is also included in
the conﬂict computation process, resulting in increased
conﬂict on compatible no-go trials compared to incompati-
ble no-go stimuli. Holroyd and Coles have proposed that the
Ne/ERN is the result of the arrival of a dopamine-driven
prediction error in the ACC where its function is primarily
updating of motor behavior. Drawing conclusions on the
effects of the current manipulations on dopamine function-
ing is clearly not possible on the basis of the current study.
However, the present ﬁndings do suggest that the size of the
prediction error and thus the impact of this signal on error-
related ACC activity may also be determined by the task of
theco-actor.Whetherthesedifferencesinamplitudeactually
lead to consequences in, for example the learning rate of
errors, remains to be determined in future research. The
differencesintheamountofdirectbehavioraladjustmentsas
reﬂected in the current measures of post-error slowing may
be taken as a ﬁrst hint that this may indeed be the case. To
summarize,ourresultsareinaccordancewiththeideathatat
the center of the three theories a signal that carries high
predictive information (either mismatch, conﬂict, or a pre-
diction error) is used to improve performance in the future
andwhosesizedeterminestheamplitudeoftheNe/ERNand
successive behavioral changes.
Indeed, the amplitude of the Ne/ERN has been directly
related to the amount of behavioral adjustments on the
following trial (Debener et al. 2005), supporting its
assumed role in adaptive behavior. Debener and co-work-
ers demonstrated a positive correlation between single-trial
Ne/ERN amplitudes and post-error slowing: the larger the
Ne/ERN, the slower the response following the error. The
current results are also in line with these ﬁndings. Increased
Ne/ERNs were found on incorrect compatible no-go trials
and were followed by slower response times compared to
responses following errors on incompatible stimuli.
Although this slowing does not serve an obvious joint
function in the current paradigm, the differences in post-
error reaction times do suggest differential behavioral
adjustments in response to the two types of errors. In daily
life, incorporating other’s tasks into one’s own error-
monitoring process may be very useful. For example, when
missing a turn while driving a car and one knows that the
passenger is carefully monitoring the road map waiting for
the passenger’s instructions while continuing driving
would be an appropriate response. However, when one
knows that the passenger is engaged in tasks other than
monitoring the route (e.g., staring out of the window
absentmindedly), an appropriate response to the error made
would be to stop the car and turn around. This example
shows that incorporating other’s tasks in error monitoring
may facilitate anticipatory and corrective behaviors in joint
actions and thus enable social adaptive behavior.
A possible limitation of the current study may be related
to the differences in the other’s response on compatible and
incompatible trials. One might argue that the difference in
Ne/ERN amplitude between the two compatibility condi-
tions may be caused by the presence of a correct go
response from the other participant on incompatible trials,
which is not present on the compatible ones. However, the
additional reaction time and Ne/ERN analyses demonstrate
that this is most likely not the case. On incompatible trials,
erroneous responses of the EEG participant are signiﬁ-
cantly faster than the correct responses from the behavioral
participant. It seems unlikely that the relatively large dif-
ference of 62 ms could affect the fast error-detection pro-
cess. Importantly, this was supported by the outcomes of
the additional Ne/ERN analyses that also included fast and
slow error trials as well as double errors. These analyses
demonstrated that the increase in Ne/ERN amplitude on
incorrect compatible trials is speciﬁc for that condition. If
the difference were caused by either a fast response from
the co-actor or the presence of a response from the other
participant in general, differences would also have been
observed on these error trials compared to incorrect
incompatible ones. Taken together, these ﬁndings indicate
that not the actual response of a co-actor affects monitoring
of own errors but that knowledge about the other’s task—
as reﬂect in shared representations—inﬂuences this action-
evaluation process.
Fig. 5 Schematic illustration of the proposed model of performance
monitoring in joint action. It shows how incorporation of a co-actor’s
task affects error-monitoring processes, resulting Ne/ERN amplitudes
and behavioral adaptations in joint action. See text for explanation
Exp Brain Res (2011) 211:397–404 403
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The current study adds to our understanding of perfor-
mance monitoring in social contexts, by showing that
people incorporate other’s tasks into their own error-
monitoring processes and adjust their behavior accord-
ingly. Existing models on performance monitoring in
individual action can be extended to explain the current
ﬁndings in joint action. A possible future research avenue
may be to focus on possible individual differences in these
processes, for example in psychiatric disorders that are
characterized by social deﬁcits like psychopathy, autism, or
schizophrenia (De Bruijn and Ullsperger 2011). Impor-
tantly, we propose that the inclusion of a co-actor’s task in
performance monitoring may facilitate social adaptive
behavior in joint action and thus provide a mechanism for
fast anticipatory and corrective behaviors in response to
other’s actions.
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